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Hulin v. Fibreboard Corp.-In Pursuit of a Workable
Framework for Adjudicative Retroactivity Analysis in
Louisiana
I. WHEN MIGHT THE ISSUE OF JUDICIAL RETROACTIVITY ARISE?-
A BRIEF INTRODUCTION
In most instances, when ajudge hands down an opinion, little attention, if any,
is given to its temporal effect' by the legal community. This is so for a simple
reason: courts generally apply settled legal principles which antedate the events
giving rise to the dispute at hand.2 But in a modem legal system, judicial rulings
which augment or impact settled "law" in some manner will inevitably subsist,3
whether the court confronts an issue which is res nova,4 interprets legislation
differently than did prior courts, or invalidates legislation based upon constitutional
provisions. The paradigmatic case "aris[es] when a court expressly overrules a
precedent upon which the contest would otherwise be decided differently and by
which the parties may previously have regulated their conduct." s Therefore,
consideration of the issue of adjudicative retroactivity has arisen primarily as an
Copyright 2000, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
i. The term "adjudicative retroactivity" is utilized throughout this paper and refers to the
temporal effect afforded ajudicial decision. See Succession of Clivens, 426 So. 2d 585.587 (La. 1983)
(for the general proposition that judicial decisions are given both retroactive and prospective effect).
A decision is given retroactive effect when it is applied to juridical acts and facts which predate the
decision and give rise to legal consequences. This encompasses parties before the announcing court and
pending cases within that jurisdiction. Implicit in the concept of precedent is the idea that a judicial
decision operates prospectively upon causes of action which accrue in the future. But see S. R. Shapiro,
Comment-Prospective or Retroactive Operation of Overruling Decision, 10 A.L.R. 1371. 1 §1 [a]
(1967-1998 Supp.) (for the unusual case "involving purely prospective application... [wherein] the
new rule is confined in its effect to future cases arising from fact situations occurring after the
announcement of the new rule"). It is this last temporal application, the exception to the rule, which
has caused the underlying legal theory to become unstable and incoherent, and so it follows that this
paper will primarily focus upon decisions which deny or discuss the propriety of adjudicative
retroactivity.
2. See James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 534, 11I S. Ct. 2439, 2443
(1991).
3. But cf discussion infra at Sections V. B & C, which assert that civilian and/or narrow (strict)
constitutional interpretation do not admit to conflicts in time between successive judicial rulings. Of
course, one should bear in mind that the topic of adjudicative retroactivity would hold little interest if
these interpretive approaches did not manifest some deficiencies when held up to practical, observable
treatment by courts and lawyers.
4. See La. Civ. Code art. 4: "When no rule for a particular situation can be derived from
legislation or custom, the court is bound to proceed according to equity. To decide equitably, resort is
made to justice, reason, and prevailing usages."
5. James B. Beam Distilling Co., 501 U.S. at 534, 111 S. Ct. at 2443. In legal scholarship, this
is often referred to as an overruling decision. Aside from constitutional overrulings, there is a simple
way to differentiate ajudicial overruling from ordinary judicial interpretation. In the first instance, the
court interprets legislation differently than it had on previous occasions. In the second, there is a
consistent or first interpretation of legislation.
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intuitive or emotive appeal to concepts of notice and reliance, e.g. that it is "unfair
to judge parties according to law of which they could not have known."6
Retroactivity analysis attempts to confront problems such as this by providing
guidance as to the appropriate temporal limitations for legal transformation."
Unfortunately, however, efforts to formulate a consistently accepted, workable
model within which to analyze the temporal effects ofjudicial decisions continues
to frustrate jurists and United States Supreme Court Justices alike.' Louisiana is
no stranger to this struggle into which the recent decision of Hulin v. Fibreboard
Corp. now thrusts its bold, Erie assertions.
I. A BRIEF FORWARD AND SURVEY OF THIS PAPER
While reading, one may be surprised at the interconnectedness of this topic to
such studies as the history and philosophy of law,9 comparative law'" and political
science." Because of this multifaceted nature, the paper was tailored around Hulin,
both to impart structure and to limit its amorphous character.' 2
6. Kermit Roosevelt. III1 A Little Theory Is a Dangerous Thing: The Myth of Adjudicative
Retroactivity, 31 Conn. L Rev. 1075, 115 (1999). Typically, the presence of a disruptive
interpretation or overruling decision is required to trigger temporal analysis. See also Jill E. Fisch,
Comment, Retroactivity andLegal Change: An EquilibriumApproach, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 1055,1084-
85 (1997) ("Commentators have suggested that fair retroactivity rules should provide notice of
applicable legal standards and protect reliance interests.... The justice of a legal system is what gives
its rules legitimacy. Notice enables people to predict the consequences of their transactions and
increases the influence of legal rules upon primary conduct.").
7. See Fisch, supra note 6, at 1056. Compare J. R. Trahan, Time for a Change: A Call to
Reform Louisiana's Intertemporal Conflicts Law (Law of Retroactivity of Laws), 59 La. L Rev. 661
(1999) (for a treatment of this subject in the legislative context).
8. See Roosevelt, supra note 6, at 1104 (which surmises that:
[t]he general dissatisfaction with the Court's retroactivity jurisprudence has not produced
a corresponding consensus on the appropriate alternative. One scholar seems to think there
is no problem; others believe that the question of retroactivity is best understood. as a
question of remedies; still another suggests that retroactivity analysis should be guided by
a model of equilibrium drawn from physics.).
9. Undoubtedly, numerous wine glasses have been emptied over enigmatic topics such as when
and if jurisprudential rulings become law, whether the Montesquian idea that the judge is simply the
oracle of the legislature frustrates the development of law (i.e. whether it shackles creative interpretation
such as that espoused by Geny's Free Scientific Research method), and to what extent Louisiana is a
mixed jurisdiction (civil or common law).
10. Broad topics like the methodology of judicial interpretation and the role of precedent in
Louisiana lend themselves to an examination of the different approaches of civil, common or
constitutional law.
II. Political structure is relevant to an examination of the role of the judicial branch.
12. This paper will not address the following: 1) Retroactivity of legislation-unless noted.
assume that adjudicative retroactivity and not legislative retroactivity is being discussed, as the two are
very different in theory and operation; 2) Constitutional issues involving the Due Process, Takings, Ex
Post Facto and Contract Clauses-though these clauses may have appeal when reliance interests are
shattered. U.S. Supreme Court rulings have given little consideration in recent years to the operation
of these venerable clauses in conjunction with legislative retroactivity, much less adjudicative
retroactivity. 3)Criminal law-this paper will focus primarily upon private law adjudication. Criminal
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The following represents a general survey of this paper. Part I.A analyzes
the basic facts and holding of Hulin. Part II.B explores the Erie mandate. Part IV
examines the federal district court's decision in Hulin, beginning with an
explication of its decision in IV.A, pointing out its deficiencies in IV.B, and then
offering an alternative approach in IV.C. Part V analyzes the federal court of
appeals' opinion, first pointing out its insufficient treatment of the Louisiana
jurisprudence in V.A, next examining its characterization and use of the U.S.
Supreme Court's decisions in V.B, and finally looking at the opinion's use of
civilian doctrine in V.C. Part VI takes the reader into some related topics. VI.A
deals with a recently developed retroactivity framework, which appears to
repackage the civilian and Blackstonian models, but may represent some further
developments. Part VI.B discusses legal mechanisms which greatly limit the
impact of adjudicative retroactivity. These may represent an end to one's temporal
inquiry and allow one to even entertain the possibility of absolute (or maximum)
retroactivity of judicial decisions. Part VI.C leads one into a basic discussion of
policy and the role of the judicial branch. As expected, the final section, Part VII,
furnishes the conclusion.
III. LOUISIANA'S LATEST SEMINAL CASE-H UUN V. FIBREBOARD CORP.
A. Facts and Holding
Hulin centered on a wrongful death action attributable to lung cancer. The
plaintiffs sued various asbestos manufacturers and a cigarette manufacturer
(American Tobacco Company) under a dual causation theory, utilizing theories of
strict liability, ultrahazardous activities, and negligence. Six weeks after the
complaint was filed, the Louisiana Supreme Court decided Halphen v. Johns-
Manville Sales Corp.,"3 which revolutionized (or consolidated) product liability law
and established a theory whereby a plaintiff need only prove that a product is
unreasonably dangerous per se. This burden of proof was derived through an
interpretation and application of various Louisiana Civil Code articles in
conjunction with jurisprudence.' 4 The test was articulated as follows: "A product
is unreasonably dangerous per se if a reasonable person would conclude that the
danger-in-fact of the product, whether foreseeable or not, outweighs the utility of
the product."'" This category of products was said to give rise to "the purest form
of strict liability."' 6
law involves a different set of considerations, such as fear of the release of large numbers of prisoners,
drain on the judicial system, habeas corpus, and the implication of various constitutional concerns.
13. 484So.2d II0(La. 1986).
14. See Hulin v. Fibreboard Corp., 178 F.3d 316, 325 (1999) (which asserts the court "applied
its previously developed products liability jurisprudence and, by analogy, as it had done in Hunt and
DeBattista, the principle of legal fault or strict liability under Civil Code articles 2317-2322.").
15. Halphen, 484 So. 2d at 114.
16. Id. at 115. (This category was "clearly distinguished from other theories in which the
manufacturer's knowledge or conduct is an issue" Id.).
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After Halphen, the plaintiffs in Hulin prudently amended their complaint to
include a product liability claim, alleging that tobacco was unreasonably dangerous
per se. The Middle District of Louisiana found that the cause of action in Hulin
accrued before Halphen was decided and that this theory of liability could not be
retroactively applied because "the creation of the 'per se' theory of products
liability [by the supreme court in] Halphen was a substantive change in the law."' 7
Thus, the plaintiffs had run out of applicable claims and the defendants were
granted a motion for summary judgment.
On appeal, the basic issue, as characterized by the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit, was whether to retroactively apply the per se theory of product
liability law, a judicial creation of the supreme court in Halphen, to causes of
action which accrued before the date of that decision. The court held that,
The Louisiana Supreme Court's decisions firmly establish the principles
that under the state constitution and the Civil Code, courts do not make
law but interpret and apply law made by the Legislature or derived from
custom. In accord with those principles, the state's highest court has held
that when it interprets the law in deciding a controversy between litigants
in one case, that decision becomes the controlling interpretation of state
law and must be given full retroactive effect in all other cases, unless the
court declares otherwise or such application is barred by prescription or
res judicata.'"
Accordingly, the decision of the lower court was reversed and on remand the
district court was to retroactively apply Halphen and the per se theory.' 9
B. The Erie Mandate
It is a bit surprising that the latest decision asserting a bold characterization of
adjudicative retroactivity in Louisiana arose out of a federal appellate court; but
then again Judge Dennis, former Justice of the Louisiana Supreme Court and
author of many precedent-setting opinions, is the author. ° In Hulin, both the
federal district court and court of appeals were required to follow the rule of Erie
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins2 that, "a federal courtsitting in diversityjurisdiction and
called upon in that role to apply state law is absolutely bound by a current
interpretation of that law formulated by the state's highest tribunal."22  So
17. Hulin v. Fibreboard Corp., 966 F. Supp. 428, 436-37 (M.D. La. 1996).
18. Hulin v. Fibreboard Corp., 178 F.3d 316, 317 (5th Cir. 1999).
'19. See Huln, 178 F.3d at 334.
20. See, e.g., Billiot v. B.P. Oil Co., 645 So. 2d 604 (La. 1994); Succession of Lauga, 624 So.
2d 1156 (La. 1993); Clomon v. Monroe City Sch. Bd., 572 So. 2d 571 (La. 1990); Moresi v. Dept. of
Wildlife & Fisheries, 567 So. 2d 1081 (La. 1990); 9 to 5 Fashions, Inc. v. Spumey, 538 So. 2d 228 (La.
1989); Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 484 So. 2d 110 (La. 1986); Bell v. Jet Wheel Blast,
462 So. 2d 166 (La. 1985); Ardoin v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 360 So. 2d 1331 (La. 1978).
21. 304 U.S. 64.58S. Ct. 817 (1938).
22. Daigle v. Maine Med. Ctr., Inc., 14 F.3d 684,689 (Ist Cir. 1994).
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inevitably one must ask whether the two federal courts accurately followed their
mandate. If the following issue of adjudicative retroactivity had been certified to
the Louisiana Supreme Court, would its answer have comported with either the
federal district or appellate court decisions?
IV. THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT'S OPINION IN HULN
A. An Explication of the Court's Reasoning
The district court confined the temporal effect of judicial interpretation in
Hulin23 by utilizing a distinction grounded in legislative retroactivity analysis. The
court began by noting, with astonishment, that at least twenty prior cases in
Louisiana had "applied the 'per se' theory to causes of action arising before
Halphen was decided... [and that n]one of these courts ever directly addressed the
issue of whether the 'per se' theory should be applied retroactively. Instead, each
court merely applied the per se theory without comment and apparently without
objection from the parties."'
The district court chose to tackle the retroactivity issue. In doing so it relied
heavily upon Young v. Logue," a recent case arising out of the Louisiana Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeal, which denied retroactive application of Halphen. Both
cases hinge the retroactive application of Halphen upon its characterization as
either substantive or procedural law, since "[s]ubstantive laws are presumed to
apply prospectively only."26
Both courts found that the theory announced in Halphen altered substantive
rights and could not be retroactively applied." Characterization of the
unreasonably dangerous perse theory as substantive law was primarily based upon
an analogy to the Louisiana Supreme Court's holding in Gilboy v. American
Tobacco Co.2 In Gilboy, the court held that the Louisiana Products Liability Act
(LPLA),39 which was designed to overrule Halphen, was substantive law and
therefore could not be retroactively applied' 3
One may ascertain that both courts are asserting a functional argument. If a
judge "divines" a whole area of product liability law out of jurisprudence and
23. Hulin v. Fibreboard Corp., 966 F. Supp. 428 (M.D. La. 1996).
24. Id. at 432-33.
25. 660 So. 2d 32 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1995).
26. Hulin, 966 F. Supp. at 433-34 ("[S]ubstantive laws either establish new rules, rights and
duties or change existing ones." Id., quoting from Rousselle v. Plaquemines Parish Sch. Bd., 633 So.
2d 1235, 1244 (La. 1994)).
27. See Young, 660 So. 2d at 56-57 (in which the court states that Halphen was a new
jurisprudential development and "did, in fact, alter the law of products liability in Louisiana and thus
should not be applied retroactively"). See also Hulin. 966 F. Supp. at 436.
28. 582 So. 2d 1263 (La. 1991).
29. La. R.S. 9:2800.51..59 (1997).
30. Gilboy, 582 So. 2d at 1264-65 (one should be aware that Gilboy concerned legislative
retroactivity).
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broad Civil Code articles, which looks and acts like a statute and which does in fact
alter legal rights, why not analogize to the reasoning in Gilboy?3' Otherwise, it
might appear that the judiciary is getting away with retroactively applying its own
substantive brand of "law," while barring the legislature from similar action, all
under the guise of legal theory.3 These judges may be frustrated with the inability
of Louisiana legal theory to grasp the practical, observable treatment of
jurisprudence in the courtroom, echoing a sentiment of Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes:
What constitutes the law? You will find some text writers telling you that
it is something different from what is decided by the courts .... that it is
a system of reason .... But if we'take the view of our friend the bad man
we shall find that he does not care two straws for the axioms of
deductions, but that he does want to know what the... courts are likely
to do in fact.... The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and
nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law.33
You could substitute almost any legal client for the hypothetical "bad man."
Parties involved in litigation generally want to know the outcome, not legal
theory.-'
Independent from the pragmatic viewpoint above, it is not very perplexing to
ascertain how the federal court in Hulin and the state court in Logue pirated the
substantive/procedural distinction into the realm of adjudicative retroactivity. Once
one divorces the jurisprudence surrounding legislative retroactivity from its
statutory base in Louisiana Civil Code article 6,1s it becomes easier to overlook the
necessity of legislation. Consulting Gilboy, one finds unsurprisingly, but
disturbingly, that Article 6 was never mentioned in the opinion, rather a string of
jurisprudence was placed in its stead. 6
31. See Young, 660 So. 2d at 57:
[The supreme court opined that Halphen's theories of recovery are substantive rights that
cannot be retroactively revoked by the Act. Thus .... just as Haiphen's theories... cannot
be denied to a plaintiff whose cause of action arose prior to the Act, neither can those
theories be applied to cases where the cause of action arose prior to Halphen in 1986.
32. It is interesting that Justice Dennis was the author of Halphen from the state bench and has
now resurrected Halphen's applicability in Hulin from the federal bench.
33. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Hary. L Rev. 457,460-61 (1897).
34. The predictability of the "result" is generally based upon the stability of the law, which is
correlative to the development of a rational, comprehensive system of legal reasoning grounded in a
statutory scheme and/or judicial interpretation (jurisprudence).
35. La. Civ. Code art. 6 provides: "(lIn the absence ofconlrary legislative expression, substantive
laws apply prospectively only. Procedural and interpretative laws apply both prospectively and
retroactively, unless there is a legislative expression to the contrary."
36. See generally Gilboy v. The American Tobacco Co., 582 So. 2d 1263, 1264-65 (1991).
Judicial decisions should purport to have their grounding in the Louisiana Civil Code or some other
statutory source. Omissions such as these are part of the reason that confusion arises in the
jurisprudence. Also at work is a semantic shift. Many cases refer to substantive "rights," not
substantive "laws," which might facilitate use of this legislative distinction in adjudicative retroactivity
analysis.
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B. The District Court Erred
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals stands upon firm legal ground in refuting
the lower court's analysis and reasoning. The district court, in its analysis, lost
sight of the theoretical underpinnings of Louisiana judicial decisions, which
generally provide that:
[Tihe decisions of a court of last resort are not the law, but only the
evidence of what the court thinks is the law. The law as construed in an
overruled case is considered as though it had never existed, and the law
as construed in the last case is considered as though it has always been the
law. As a general rule, the law as construed in the last decision operates
both prospectively and retrospectively .... .
When delving into distinctions about whether the unreasonably dangerous per
se product liability theory announced in Halphen was, substantive or procedural
law, the Hulin lower court cited cases which, with the exception of Young v. Logue,
dealt with retroactivity of legislation.3
All these cases were based upon Article 6."9 Of particular importance is the
article's use of the word "laws." The Louisiana Civil Code, in keeping with its
continental siblings, expressly states in Article 1 that, "[t]he sources of law are
legislation and custom," a contrario sensu, notjurisprudence.' Whether one calls
judicial precedent thunderous commands from Mount Olympus or those written
statements that most Louisiana lawyers rely upon when researching an issue, it is
not contemplated as "law" pursuant to Article 6. Also, if Article 6 were to apply
to judicial decisions, the phrase "unless there is a legislative expression to the
contrary" would be rendered perplexing and superfluous.
Fortunately, though not specifically referring to Article 6, the Louisiana
Supreme Court did ultimately clarify that it was referring to the temporal effects of
37. Norton v. Crescent City Ice Mfg. Co., Inc.. 178 La. 135, 145, 150 So. 855, 858 (1933).
38. Interestingly, even if the substantive/procedural distinction were analogized to judicial
overrulings, the conclusions reached would be opposite. See Shapiro, supra note 1, at I § 5 [a]:
[R]etroactive application of an overruling decision has been denied where the court has
found that "procedure" was involved, but retroactive application of an overruling decision
has been permitted where the court has found that "substantive law" was involved....
[Ulnder the classical theory rights embodied in a newly announced judicial nle are deemed
to have always been in existence, to deny such a rule retrospective effect would deprive the
holder of the right of its benefit, as would be the case if a statute eliminating a pre-existing
right were given retrospective effect.
Cases in the common law bear this out, see, e.g., Sheperd v. Consumers Co-op Ass'n., 384 S.W.2d 635
(Mo. 1964); Curtis v. Basby, 366 P.2d 616 (Okla. 1961); Moore v. Ready Mixed Concrete Co., 329
S.W.2d 14 (Mo. 1959).
39. For the text of La. Civ. Code at. 6, see supra note 35.
40. See La. Civ. Code art. 1, cmt. (b): "According to civilian doctrine, legislation and custom
are authoritative or primary sources of law. They are contrasted with persuasive or secondary sources
of law, such as jurisprudence, doctrine, conventional usages, and equity, that may guide the court in
reaching a decision in the absence of legislation and custom."
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legislation in Gilboy, and not judicial interpretation, with the declaration that, "A
statute that changes settled law relating to substantive rights only has prospective
effect."14'
Therefore, even if one is pragmatic in nature, Gilboy was the wrong case to
analogize and the substantive/procedural distinction was an erroneous route to take
when approaching judicial retroactivity. There is no statutorial, jurisprudential or
logical reason for incorporating this imprecise, ambiguous distinction.
C. What Could the Federal District Court Have Done?-A Brief Examination
of the Jurisprudence
1. Louisiana Jurisprudence
An examination of the Louisiana jurisprudence reveals that there is an
alternative course by which the court could have arrived at its functionalist result.
Though as of late, the populace, media and courtrooms of the United States appear
to have little empathy for the litigative plight of cigarette manufacturers, there is an
equitable argument to be made on their and other manufacturers behalf. Before
Halphen, manufacturers had a stronger shield residing in the interpretative
formulations of products liability law. After Halphen, these companies became
more vunerable to litigation. Approximately two years later, after the LPLA went
into effect, it seemed that they were back under the more fortified protection of the
law. That two year hiatus, instigated by thejudiciary rather than the legislature, led
to the result-oriented conclusion that all product liability suits arising before
September 1, 1988 (the effective date of the LPLA) were governed by the
unreasonably dangerous per se theory and other characterizations of product
liability law announced in Halphen. So now courts are stumbling over cases such
as Hulin, in which legislation that was written almost ten years earlier (the LPLA)
is not being applied.43 Product manufacturers had no advance warning that
plaintiffs were about to become fully armed with the per se theory' and to have
Halphen apply retroactively could have led to some very improper business risk
assessments, severe underinsurance and underfinancing. ;
Mindful of this, the district court could have explored Louisiana decisions
which have recognized and acted upon a realization of temporal conflict between
judicial interpretations in the private law.4' The Louisiana Supreme Court's
41. Gilboy v. The American Tobacco Co., 582 So. 2d 1263, 1265 (1991) (emphasis added).
42. See generally Trahan, supra note 7, at 706 (for the proposition that Louisiana's current
legislative retroactivity law, utilizing the substantive/procedural distinction, is seriously deficient in
theory and application).
43. See, e.g., Toups v. Seaw, Roebuck and Co., Inc., 507 So. 2d 809 (La. 1987) (Halphen was
heavily cited in the "LAW" section of this opinion, in a case where the injury dated back to 1977.).
44. See William E. Crawford & David J. Shelby. I, Tons. 53 La. L Rev. 1011. 1014 (1993)
(which stated that "the Halphen unreasonably dangerous per se claim becomes a formidable weapon
against cigarette manufacturers due to the low social utility of cigarettes").
45. See, e.g., In re adoption of B.G.S., 556 So. 2d 545 (La. 1990); Bergeron v. Bergeron, 492 So.
2d 1193 (La. 1986); Harlaux v. Harlaux. 426 So. 2d 602 (La. 1983); Succession of Clivens. 426 So. 2d
1010 [Vol. 60
decision in Harlaux v. Harlaux' stated, "generally, unless a decision specifies
otherwise, or its retroactive application would produce substantial inequitable
results, it is to be given prospective and retroactive effect." 7 Though there are few
prospective decisions, many of the latest have been guided by Lovell v. Lovell,"
which slightly adapted the U. S. Supreme Court's Chevron Oil9 test:
In determining whether or not our decision should be given retroactive
effect, three factors should be considered: (1) the decision to be applied
nonretroactively must establish a new principle of law, either by
overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied, or by
deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly
foreshadowed; (2) the merits and demerits must be weighed in each case
by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and
effect, and whether retrospective application will further or retard its
operation; and (3) the inequity imposed by retroactive application must be
weighed.-'
The applicability of the Lovell-Chevron test to the facts of Hulin is unclear.
Just because there have been multiple, intervening decisions between Halphen and
Hulin does not subtract from the observation that at the time Halphen was decided,
it was a decision which established a new principle of law that overruled clear past
precedent.' Factor (2) of the Lovell-Chevron test gets more complicated. One
could arguably say that since "law" is to be derived from the legislature, and the
legislature promptly overruled Halphen, that retroactive application would retard
the legislature's intent. But this is looking to subsequent, rather than prior, history.
Factor (3) is open to argument; perhaps some sort of cost-benefit analysis or other
empirical evidence relating to risk assessment or insurance would be effective.
The most marked application of the Lovell-Chevron test in Louisiana was
Succession of Clivens.5" Prior to Clivens, the Louisiana Supreme Court declared
in Succession of Brown 3 that (former) Civil Code article 919, which effectively
barred many illegitimate children from asserting inheritance rights in testate and
intestate successions, was unconstitutional. It does not take great imagination to
envision the possible upheaval that maximum retroactive application of this holding
585 (La. 1983); Lovel v. Lovell. 378 So. 2d 418 (La. 1979); Jackson v. Doe, 296 So. 2d 323 (La.
1974); Barnett v. Develle, 289 So. 2d 129 (La. 1974); LeBlanc v. Henderson, 259 So. 2d 557 (La.
1972); Sumrall v. J.C. Penney Co., 239 La. 762,120 So. 2d67 (1960); Succession of Lambert, 210 La.
636, 28 So. 2d 1 (1946).
46. 426 So. 2d 602 (La. 1983).
47. Id. at604 (paraphrasing Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701,89 S. Ct. 1897 (1969) and
Lovell v. Lovell, 378 So. 2d 418 (La. 1979)).
48. 378 So. 2d 418 (La. 1979).
49. Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 92 S. Ct. 349 (1971).
50. Lovell, 378 So. 2d at 422.
5I. Of course, the opportunity for subsequent attack outside of the announcing opinion could be
met with the classic open floodgates analogy (a judicial efficiency argument).
52. 426 So. 2d 585 (La. 1982).
53. 388 So.2d 1151 (La. 1980).
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could have upon succession and property law.' So the court promptly tackled the
issue in Clivens, declaring that unlimited retroactivity of Brown would "work a
substantial injustice" and "that the balance between all such factors" would best be
served by a limited retroactive application to the effective date of the Louisiana
Constitution of 1974.55
Also of note is In re Adoption of B.G.S.,5' in which the Louisiana Supreme
Court denied retroactive application of its decision, which declared
unconstitutional an adoption statute that purported to give the mother of an
illegitimate child the power to terminate the father's parental rights without notice
or an opportunity to be heard. The Court did not cite the Lovell-Chevron test or
any other maxims of adjudication, rather it simply stated that given the strong
interest in finality and stability in familial relations and"[c]onsidering the interests
ofjustice, stability of institutions and administrative convenience we conclude that
our due process interpretation shall be applied prospectively only, except that it
shall have retroactive effect in the case at bar and in any case pending
below .... ,,s This is a very notable decision, mostly because of its recentness,
strong equitable component, lack of legal authority (including precedent), and its
use of modified or selective prospectivity, which has been recently rejected by the
U.S. Supreme Court."
2. A Glance at the Common Law
If the district court wanted to, it could have turned to other states and, while
not very authoritative, it would have found that the common law is rife with cases
limiting or denying the retroactive effect ofjudicial overrulings. A comprehensive
analysis of the U. S. jurisprudence is provided in an American Law Report by S.
R. Shapiro, in which this phenomena is demonstrated in many different areas of
law, such as: torts, 9 abolition of immunities,60 evidence, jury instructions, antitrust
law, conflict of laws, damages, and insurance. 6"
A reliance argument would be fairly easy to articulate based on legal theories
supplied by courts in the above areas, especially in common law jurisdictions
where judicial decisions are officially recognized as giving shape and formation to
54. See Clivens. 426 So. 2d at 593-94. Consider reliance interests of heirs and third parties
towards property, which may have been consumed or have changed hands numerous times.
55. Id. at 594, 600 (which also established that "states are free to limit the retroactivity of their
civil decisional law when necessary and advisable." Id. at 594).
56. 556 So. 2d 545 (La. 1990).
57. Id. at 559 (Pending cases were further limited to those in which a "natural father ... has filed
a pleading asserting his interest in the child prior to an interlocutory decree of adoption." Id.).
58. See infra Part V.B.
59. E.g.; abolition of gross negligence doctrine, abolition of defense of assumption of risk. right
of action for loss of consortium, contribution among joint tortfeasors, unconstitutionality of guest
statute, contributory negligence and comparative negligence.
60. Eg., charitable, governmental, parental, and inter-spousal immunities.
61. See generally Shapiro. supra note 1. at . B, §§ 12.13.15-19.22.22.5.24.27.
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the law through the operation of stare decisis.2 Even though mention of analogous
cases from common law jurisdictions may carry little legal weight in Louisiana, it
might be useful for demonstrating the equities and practicalities involved.
3. Wrap Up
Whatever one concludes as to the applicability of the Lovel-Chevron test to
Hulin, an approach based upon equity (fairness, notice and reliance) and policy
(efficiency or facilitating transitions between legal regimes) would have been a
superior one to the procedural/substantive route taken by the federal district court.63
The Louisiana cases cited amply demonstrate the viability of such an approach in
the event that a difficult retroactive application of a creative or unsettling judicial
interpretation is encountered. Of course, a great likelihood remains that in the vast
majority of cases Louisiana's recognition of the declarative function of the judge,
as reflected in Hulin," and the presumption of retroactivity will circumvent such
arguments. But at a minimum, such assertions will put pressure upon an appellate
court to properly deal with the Louisiana jurisprudence and to perhaps articulate
clear standards for approaching adjudicative retroactivity. Pressure of this sort was
not applied to the Hulin appellate court.
V. THE FIFrH CIRCUrr COURT OF APPEALS DECISION
A. The Court of Appeals Did not Adequately Reconcile its Decision with
Louisiana Jurisprudence
Judge Dennis appears to whitewash over Louisiana cases, which have
consistently shied away from a rule of absolute retroactivity since 1946.65 Two
short paragraphs in Hulin discuss the jurisprudence, in which the primary point
being made is that, "In the relatively small number of cases in which the Louisiana
Supreme Court has limited the retroactive effect of its own decisions, it has
expressly done so in the same opinion that announced the decision.'
This assertion displays some hostility towards nonretroactive holdings by
appearing to forclose subsequent review by a later court of the temporal application
of an earlier court. If one fails to raise the inequity of a judicial overruling in a
particular case, later attempts in other forums could be struck down by simply
quoting the language above. But how accurate is this characterization? The
supreme court did not limit the retroactive effect of Succession of Brown until the
later case of Succession of Clivens. This is a major Louisiana decision on the topic,
62. Accordingly, one generally finds a more marked embrace of prospective decisionmaking in
common law jurisdictions than in Louisiana. See generally, Shapiro, supra note 1.
63. For a more thorough analysis of these principles see infra Part VI.C.
64. Hulin v. Fibreboard Corp., 178 F.3d 316 (5th Cir. 1999).
65. See, e.g.. cases cited, supra note 45 (which does not include criminal law decisions).
66. Hulin. 178 F.3d at 322.
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which tends to rouse suspicion as to where one is being led. 7 After reading the
opinion one is left with the impression that Louisiana embraces or is moving
towards an absolutist approach in which the prospect of nonretroactive holdings
will greatly diminish, if not disappear. Consider the following quote from Hulin
concerning the retroactive application of res nova decisions:
In most cases ... when the Louisiana Supreme Court interprets and
applies Civil Code principles by analogy to cases unforeseen by the Code,
the issue of the temporal effect of the decision is not raised, because it is
so weil understood that whatever the court now holds to be the law of the
Civil Code becomes what has always been the law, even if the new
holding overrules or modifies an earlier decision of the court."
Nevertheless, in the private law, the Louisiana Supreme Court has not
expressly rejected the Lovell-Chevron test, nor has it since offered any formulative
approach to the issue of adjudicative retroactivity; though there are fairly recent
cases such as In re Adoption of B.G.S.Y where the decision was denied full
retroactive effect. But two very recent state court of appeal cases have applied the
Lovell-Chevron test."' Surprisingly, subsequent review of these decisions by the
Louisiana Supreme Court implicitly affirmed the non-retroactive application of
both decisions, in which no comment was made upon the application of the Lovell-
Chevron test.71
Considering the above, one could rather strongly assert that the Louisiana
Supreme Court has continued, in certain cases, to entertain arguments which would
limit retroactive application of judicial overrulings.72 This, despite Hulin's firm
statement that "whatever the court now holds to be the law.., becomes what has
always been the law. '73 To date, the supreme court has not espoused anything as
67. Of course, a denial of subsequent attack outisde of the announcing opinion could be bolstered
with the opening of the floodgates analogy (judicial efficiency).
68. Hulin, 178 F.3d at 321 (emphasis added).
69. 556 So. 2d 545 (La. 1990). See discussion supra Part P.C.
70. Wheeler v. La. Dep't of Transp. & Dev., 675 So. 2d 788 (La. App. 4th Cir.), rev'd, 679 So.
2d 1363 (La. 1996); Magee v. Landrieu. 653 So. 2d 62 (La. App. I st Cir.), writ denied, 654 So. 2d 319
(La. 1995).
71. The supreme court reversed Wheeler, but did not question the utilization of Lovell-Chevron.
rather, the holding of retroactivity produced by the application of Lovell-Chevron. The supreme court
cited Magee in the reversal, which applied Lovell-Chevron to a similar factual situation, but with the
opposite outcome (prospective application). Only two Justices would have granted the writ. See
Magee, 653 So. 2d at 65 ("Jurisprudence has recognized that where a decision could produce
substantial inequitable results if applied retroactively there is ample basis for avoiding the 'injustice and
hardship' by a holding of nonretroactivity." Id. at 67).
72. One might also wish to consider the continued non-retroactive application of decisions in
criminal law. See, e.g., State ex rel. Taylor v. Whitley, 606 So. 2d 1292 (La. 1992) (jury instruction
declared unconstitutional; for a fairly recent supreme court decision which was not retroactively applied
and which contains an excellent run through of criminal adjudicative retroactivity analysis in
Louisiana).
73. Hulin v. Fibreboard Corp., 178 F.3d 316, 321 (5th Cir. 1999).
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strongly written as the court of appeals opinion in Hulin and it is not clear that it
would.
Criticism over the mischaracterization of Louisiana jurisprudence has nothing
to do with the excellent theoretical reasoning in Hulin, but rather concerns the Erie
mandate that a federal court is bound by the current interpretation of law, as
formulated by the state's highest tribunal. More analysis and discussion of
Louisiana's jurisprudential history definitely seemed in order.
The opinion does buttress its approach with the excellent example of the
jurisprudential development of a complete body of mineral law, during which
temporal issues were not raised.74 Judge Dennis has demonstrated theoretical
consistency in such cases as Frazier v. Harper" and Ardoin v. Hartford Accident
& Indem. Co."' Also, portions of the Hulin opinion, which dealt with the U.S.
Supreme Court, demonstrated that Chevron had been interred, which could
impliedly spell an end in Louisiana to the Lovell-Chevron analysis.
B. Did Hulin Accurately Characterize the Current Stance of the U.S. Supreme
Court?
In the turbulent seas of retroactivity doctrine, it appears that the Louisiana
Supreme Court has often cast its anchor in the same vicinity as that of the U.S.
Supreme Court." Louisiana has very little explicit civilian tradition upon this topic
and the fact that our courts have entertained retroactivity analysis on numerous
occasions, dating back more than fifty years, points one away from a historically
civilian treatment of this topic.
7
'
74. Id. (This "law" was designed to "regulate and accommodate properly interests created or
affected by the unforeseen phenomenon of oil and gas production.").
75. 600 So. 2d 59,63 (La. 1992) ("Mhe judicial decisions in... (Sims v. Sims and T.L James
;& Co. v. Montgomeryj did not create law to be applied prospectively but interpreted principles of
legislated law that antedated and governed the matrimonial regimes in those cases and similarly apply
to the present case").
76. 360 So. 2d 1331 (La. 1978). "In deciding the issue before us the lower courts did not follow
the process of referring first to the code and other legislative sources but treated language from a
judicial opinion as the primary source of law." Id. at 1334.
77. See, e.g.. State ex rel. Taylor v. Whitley, 606 So. 2d 1292 (La. 1992); State v. Sanders, 523
So. 2d 209 (La. 1988); State v. St. Pierm, 515 So. 2d 769 (La. 1987); Succession of Clivens, 426 So.
2d 585 (La. 1982); Lovell v. Lovell, 378 So. 2d 418 (La. 1979); State v. Collum. 365 So. 2d 1272 (La.
1978); State v. Liesk, 326 So. 2d 871 (La. 1976); Jackson v. Doe. 296 So. 2d 323 (La. 1974); Barnett
v. Develle, 289 So. 2d 129 (La. 1974); City of New Orleans v. Harris, 283 So. 2d 207 (La. 1973); State
ex rmi. LeBlanc v. Henderson, 259 So. 2d 557 (La. 1972).
78. See Succession of Lambert, 210 La. 636. 28 So. 2d 1 (1946). See also discussion infra at
V.C.
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I. Theoretically, the U.S. Supreme Court Should be an Excellent
Sounding Board for Adjudicative Retroactivity Analysis in Louisiana
The Hulin appellate court began its consideration of the U.S. Supreme Court
doctrine with the following statement:
The Supreme Court of Louisiana, like courts of other states, gives careful
attention to the United States Supreme Court's opinions explaining
common-law traditions and constitutional principles that influence the
role of the judiciary and the temporal effects of judicial decisions.
Accordingly, we must take those opinions into account in our effort to
ascertain the probable course of future developments in the Louisiana
doctrine of retroactivity.79
This is a meritorious statement. Keep in mind that most federal and state
"U]udicial decisions operate on several different kinds of law: common law,
statutes, and the Constitution. "se Segmented as such, one may push for different
modes of analysis. Statutory interpretation is intended to be a declarative function,
and thus there are really no theoretical temporal problems presented: "Since an
unchanging statute backs the judicial interpretations, it makes sense to say that
while decisions may change, the law remains the same."8' Thus the new, correct
decision is always applied. At the other end of the spectrum is the common law,
which has "no positive source independent ofjudicial decisions, [therefore] the law
must change as the decisions change. Consequently, it makes sense to distinguish
between old law and new law." 2 Then there is constitutional law, which lies
somewhere in the middle of the two interpretive extremes.
The high court has examined the issue of adjudicative retroactivity primarily
in the context of judicial overrulings based upon constitutional and statutory
interpretation and notjurisprudential shifts in the common law. Thus, although the
U.S. Supreme Court purports to have examined this issue, it has only done so when
its judicial decisions were closely grounded in positive law. This fits neatly with
Louisiana's civilian tradition of not recognizing judicial decisions as a source of
law,"- as opposed to the common law concept of stare decisis.
There is justifiable skepticism toward Louisiana's nonrecognition of judicial
decisions as law,"' just as there is with pinpointing some of the latest
"fundamental" and First Amendment rights in the immutable letters of the
79. Hulin v. Fibreboard Corp., 178 F.3d 316. 329 (5th Cir. 1999).
80. Roosevelt, supra note 6, at 1076.
81. Id.
82. Id. See also Shapiro, supra note 1. at 1 §2 (for the proposition that the common law has
proven fertile ground for the topic of adjudicative retroactivity: "[The modem decisions, taking a more
pragmatic view of thejudicial function,... now treat the question of how an overruling decision should
operate as one of judicial policy rather than of judicial power..... Id.).
83. See La. Civ. Code art. 1: "The sources of law are legislation and custom."
84. An attorney who takes Article I to its logical extreme should invest heavily in malpractice
insurance.
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Constitution. Consider the following quote regarding the source of constitutional
law in conjunction with the operation of the Louisiana judiciary, which has on
occasion crafted statute-like causes of action out of Louisiana Civil Code article
2315:
Constitutional law has a positive source-the hallowed
document-independent of judicial decisions. But the view that the
Constitution means now what it always has, and always will, has serious
difficulties.... [lit is hard to keep a straight face while suggesting that
the current panoply of substantive and procedural rights has always
existed, or... that the First Amendment has always embodied its current
congeries of doctrines and distinctions."
Comparing a creative judicial interpretation, such as that in Halphen, tocertain
forms of constitutional interpretation, seems a better analogy than comparing
Halphen to common law formation or perhaps even statutory interpretation.
Accordingly, a close examination of Supreme Court decisions might be well
warranted if one is attempting to formulate a Louisiana approach to adjudicative
retroactivity.
2. Some History--Recognition of Non-retroactivity of Judicial Decisions
is Born
The general presumption in civil and common law systems is that legislation
applies prospectively and judicial decisions apply prospectively and retroactively M
This is consistent with traditional conceptualizations of coordinate but separate
branches of government and has been the basic legal norm "for near a thousand
years." One scholar has suggested that "[u]ntil the 1960s, the question of
retroactivity was a dog that did not bark... [because the courts] simply followed
the general rule that a court must decide the cases before it according to the best
current understanding of the law.""
The Warren Court ushered in change with its Linkletter v. Walker" opinion.
Linkletter addressed the propriety of retroactive application of Mapp v. Ohio,"'
which held the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule applicable to the states. The
issue was whether the Mapp rule could be invoked by habeas petitions of those
85. Roosevelt, supra note 6. at 1076-77.
86. See Fsch. supm note 6. at 1057 (hs presumption"is a matterof black letter law." Id.). See
also Hulin v. Fibreboard Corp., 178 F.3d 316,319-23 (5th Cir. 1999) for a discussion of the operative
norm of judicial decisions. See also La. Civ. Code art. 6
87. Harperv. Virginia Dep't ofTaxatlon, 509 U.S. 86,94, 113 S. C1. 2510,2516 (1993) (quoting
Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co.. 215 U.S. 349, 372,30 S. Ct. 140, 148 (1910) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
88. Roosevelt, supra note 6, at 1117. Note that there is some dispute as to this characterization
of the U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence. This has been termed the "decision-time model." which is
discussed in greater detail in Part VI.A infra. Bus cf Oreat Northern Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil &
Refining Co.. 287 U.S. 358. 53 S. Ct. 145 (1932).
89. 381 U.S. 618, 85S. Ct. 1731(1965).
90. 367 U.S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684 (1961).
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convicted before the Mapp decision. The Court found that the effect of a
subsequent ruling is subject to no set "'principle of absolute retroactive invalidity'
but depends upon a consideration of 'particular relations'.... [and] in appropriate
cases the Court may in the interest of'justice make the rule prospective."9' Support
for this decision was not unanimous, but was "backed both by Justices who saw in
non-retroactivity a means to implement desired reforms without inflicting
unacceptable disruption on the criminal justice system and by those who disagreed
with the reforms [of such cases as' Miranda v. Arizona2 ] and accepted non-
retroactivity as a way to limit their effect."'93 The U.S. Supreme Court has
addressed the appropriate temporal limits of judicial overrulings in such areas as
criminal procedure," determination of statutes of limitations" and the
constitutionality of certain taxes in tax refund cases."
3. Searching for the Supreme Court's Current Stance
The latest U.S. Supreme Court opinions appear to have moved in the direction
of absolute retroactivity for judicial overrulings, but any attempt at deriving
coherent reasoning or application will be met with disappointment. Consider that
"seven Justices in Harper could have agreed on retroactive application of
precedent without articulating an explicit rationale, [and] without reaching the
substance of the retroactivity issue."' One legal scholar laments:
[Riecently, the Supreme Court's recognition of the intellectual poverty of
its retroactivity analysis has led to efforts to formulate a more rational
analytical structure, albeit with limited success. The Court has addressed
retroactivity questions on at least seven occasions in the past five years,
but its decisions, rife with separate opinions, reflect a variety of
conflicting and confusing approaches."'"
What is decipherable from Supreme Court jurisprudence is the emergence of
three distinct temporal appplications of judicial decisions after Linkletter. First, a
91. Lnkletter, 381 U.S. at 627-28,85 S. Ct. 1736-37.
92. 384 U.S. 436, 86S. C. 1602(1966).
93. Roosevelt, supra note 6. at 1093. It is fitting that the birth of prospective decisionmaking,
which has given way to much confusion and differing opinion, was the product of such tension.
94. See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 107 S. Ct. 708 (1987); Mackey v. U.S., 401 U.S.
667, 91 S. Ct. 1160 (1971); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 87 S. Ct. 1967 (1967); IUnkletter v.
Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 85 S. Ct. 1731 (1965).
95. See Goodman v. Likens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 107 S. Ct. 2617 (1987); Saint Francis
College v. AI-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 107 S. Ct. 2022 (1987); Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97,
92 S. Ct. 349 (1971).
96. See Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 113 S. Ct. 2510 (1993); James B.
Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 111 S. Ct. 2439 (1991); American Trucking Ass'ns v.
Smith. 496 U.S. 167, 110 S. Ct. 2323 (1990).
97. Jim Chen, The Mystery and the Mastery of the Judicial Power, 59 Mo. L Rev. 281, 301-02
(1994).
98. See Fisch, supra note 6, at 1058.
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decision may be made fully retroactive. This is overwhelmingly the norm and
reflects the declaratory theory of judicial interpretation. Second, there is the purely
prospective method of overruling, in which the new rule is not applied to the
parties before the court or to cases arising before that decision, but instead becomes
a vehicle for announcing the new law. This approach recognizes that application
of a new rule to parties who relied on the old may offend notions of justice and
fairness. Finally, a court may apply a new rule in the case in which it is decided,
but return to the old one for all cases predating that decision. Termed modified, or
selective prospectivity, this method developed in the criminal law at a time when
the Court developed new rules to insure protection of the rights of the accused and
was concerned that a criminal defendant usually only seeks one thing on appeal, the
reversal of his conviction."
In Harper v. Virginia Dept. of Taxation,W a state tax upon a number of federal
civil service and military retirees was found unconstitutional based upon an earlier
ruling in Davis v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury.'"' Petitioners were seeking a refund
for improperly assessed taxes from 1985-88. The state of Virginia passed
legislation which attempted to mitigate these claims but did not purport to fully
refund the taxes collected during the three years in question. In denying the relief
requested by petitioners, the Virginia Supreme Court applied the Chevron Oil Co.
v. Huson"° test, which had extended the question of nonretroactive application of
judicial decisions outside of criminal law and into civil law. Chevron implemented
a three factor discretionary test which was presented as the Lovell-Chevron test in
Part IV.C 03
Justice Thomas, joined by Justices Blackmun, Stevens, Scalia, and Souter,
wrote the majority opinion in Harper, overruling the Virginia Supreme Court. In
the process, the Chevron discretionary approach and selective prospectivity, in both
the criminal and civil context, were interred and the viability of nonretroactive
application of future Supreme Court holdings was cast in doubt:
Mindful of the 'basic norms of constitutional adjudication' that animated
our view of retroactivity in the criminal context, we now prohibit the
erection of selective temporal barriers to the application of federal law in
non-criminal cases. In both civil and criminal cases, we can scarcely
permit 'the substantive law (to] shift and spring' according to 'the
particular equities of [individual parties'] claims' of actual reliance on an
old rule and of harm from a retroactive application of the new rule.' 0'
Justices White and Kennedy subscribed to those parts of the majority opinion
which produced a retroactive application, but did not concur in the reasoning
99. See James B. Beam Distilling Co., 501 U.S. at 535-38, 111 S. Ct. at 2443-44.
100. 509 U.S. 86, 113 S. Ct. 2510 (1993).
101. 489 U.S. 803, 109 S. Ct. 1500 (1989).
102. 404 U.S. 97, 92 S. Ct. 349 (197 1).
103. Chevron, 404 U.S. at 106-07, 92 S. Ct. at 355. ("(Tjhere is ample basis in our cases for
avoiding the 'injustice or hardship' by a holding of nonretroactivity.").
104. Harper, 509 U.S. at 97, 113 S. Ct. at 2517 (internal citations omitted).
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above, stating that, "Prospective overruling allows courts to respect the principle
of stare decisis even when they are compelled to change the law in light of new
understanding.... When a court promulgates a new rule of law, prospective
application functions 'to avoid injustice or hardship to civil litigants who have
justifiably relied on prior law."' 05 But the Justices felt that in this case a new
principle of law was not announced.'1 6
In a separate concurrence, Justice Scalia fought alone for a return to the
Blackstonian model: "[A] judge overruling [a]... decision would 'not pretend to
make a new law, but to vindicate the old one, from misrepresentation."' It is not
that a prior decision "was bad law, but that it was not law."'" 7
Justice O'Connor and Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the dissent: "Today the
Court applies a new rule of retroactivity to impose crushing and unnecessary
liability on the States, precisely at a time when they can least afford it."'0  The
dissenters went on to chastise the majority for its careless dicta, which they felt was
intended to cast prospectivity in doubt, stating that "no decision of the Court
forecloses the possibility of pure prospectivity."Il In support of nonretroactive
application, the dissent invoked Justice Frankfurter: "We should not indulge in the
fiction that the law now announced has always been the law .... It is much more
conducive to law's self-respect to recognize candidly the considerations that give
prospective content to a new pronouncement of law.""' Alternatively, the dissent
applied the Chevron Oil test and would have rendered a prospective application
because, "[r]etroactive application of rulings that invalidate state tax laws have the
potential for producing 'disruptive consequences for the State[s] and [their] citizens
... threatening the State[s'] current operations and future plans.'"'1
Reynoldsviile Casket Co. v. Hyde"' is the latest case addressing adjudicative
retroactivity doctrine, but provides the reader with a further twist. Petitioner, aware
of the Supreme Court's current displeasure with holdings that limit the retroactive
effect of judicial decisions, asked the court to examine her case "not through the
lens of 'retroactivity,' but through that of 'remedy."' "'3 Petitioner quoted Justice
Harlan for support, "who, before Chevron Oil, pointed out that 'equitable
considerations' such as 'reliance' might prove relevant to 'relief."'1' 4 This
105. Id. at 110, 113 S. Ct. at 2524 (quoting American Trucking Ass'ns., Inc. v. Smith. 496 U.S.
167, 197, 110 S. Ct. 2323, 2341 (1990) (plurality opinion)).
106. Harper, 509 U.S. at 112,113 S.Ct. at2526.
107. 1 W. Blackstone, Comnmentanes 69.70 (1765). quoted in Harper. 509 U.S. 86,107,113 S.
C1. 2510, 2523 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring).
108. Harper, 509 U.S. at 113, 113 S. Ct. at 2526 (O'Connor, J. dissenting). The majority
approach is "so rigid that it produce[sJ unconscionable results." Id. at 117, 2528.
109. Id.at 115, 113 S. Ct. at2527.
110. Id. at 116-17, 113 S. Ct. at 2528 (quoting Oriffin v. minois, 351 U.S. 12, 26, 76 S. Ct. 585,
594 (1956)).
II1. Harper, 509 U.S. at 129, 113 S. Ct. at 2535 (quoting American Trucking Ass'ns., Inc. v.
Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 182, 110 S.Q. 2323, 2333 (1990) (plurality opinion)).
112. 514U.S. 749. IISS. C. 1745(1995).
113. Id.at752, 115S.Ct.at1748.
114. Id. at 753, 115 S. Ct. at 1748 (quoting U.S. v. Estate of Donnelly, 397 U.S. 286,296-97,90
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alternative argument is fairly straightforward. A court may apply an overruling
decision retroactively, but deny a particular or burdensome remedy or. refuse to
apply any remedy at all. " s
In Reynoldsvile, the majority opinion acknowledged that ordinary retroactive
application "may or may not, involve a further matter of remedies.""'6 But the
court failed to propose any guidelines, instead offering rather generally that it
"depend(s) like almost all legal issues-upon the kind of case, matter, and
circumstances involved.""' The court then cryptically stated that the remedial
issue would not be broached because this case did not present anything more than
"simple reliance.""18
Interestingly, Justice Kennedy, joined by O'Connor, noted in his concurrence
that, "We do not read [the Reynoldsviile opinion] ... to surrender in advance our
authority to decide that in some exceptional cases, courts may shape relief in light
of disruption of important reliance interests or the unfairness caused by unexpected
judicial decisions."" 9 Thus, it remains to be seen whether the door behind which
the remedial approach lies will remain shut or provide an easy exit in troubling
cases.
4. Which Way Do We Go-Whom Do We Follow?
One should not now doubt the confusion surrounding the adjudicative
retroactivity jurisprudence of the Supreme Court. Judge Dennis states that "the
persuasive influence that the United States Supreme Court's decisions have on state
courts with respect to retroactivity doctrine now will weigh on the side of the rule
of adjudicative retroactivity."'" While the premise of this statement may be true,
deriving a stable, coherent approach should involve reasoning which is divorced
from the Court or one which favors articulations of select members of the high
court.
Therefore, it is not surprising to find in the Supreme Court the portion of the
Hulin'' opinion heavy reliance upon reasoning which most closely resembles that
of Justice Scalia. His classical approach to issues involving separation of powers
fits squarely into a legal framework, such as that of Louisiana, which denies judges
S. Ct. 1033, 1039 (1970)).
115. See id. at 754,115 S. Ct. at 1749 (Once "a rule is found to apply 'backward,' there may then
be a further issue of remedies, i.e.. whether the party prevailing under a new rule should obtain the same
relief that would have been awarded if the rule had been an old one.") (quoting James B. Beam
Distilling Co. v. Georgia. 501 U.S. 529,535. 11I S. Ct. 2439 (1991) (plurality opinion of Souter, J.)).
116. Reynoldsville, 514 U.S. at759, 115 S. Ct. at 1751.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 761, 115 S. Ct. at 1752. See also Harper v. Virginia Dept. of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86,
133, 113 S. Ct. 2510,2537 (1993). in which Justices O'Connor and Rehnquist were of the opinion that
"it should be constitutionally permissible for the equities to inform the remedial inquiry."
120. Hulin v. Fibreboard Corp., 178 F.3d 316, 327 (5th Cir. 1999).
121. Id.
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the status of lawmakers.' " Justice Scalia would urge that the nature of judicial
review constrains the Court to apply decisions retroactively, elevating it to a
constitutional mandate. But there is hardly a consensus among the majority of the
Supreme Court: "In fact, despite the apparent retreat from Chevron Oil, a majority
of the Court has never expressly recognized any constitutional limitation on
adjudicative nonretroactivity."' I
C. Did the Court of Appeals Accurately Characterize'Civilian Theory?
1. Why the Strong Appeal to Civil Law in this Opinion?
From an opinion-writing perspective, use of Louisiana's civilian roots seems
a simple way to distinguish our state's methodology from the confusion that
adjudicative retroactivity doctrine has generated in both the common law and in the
U.S. Supreme Court. In this respect, Louisiana often finds itself in an enviable
position with respect to legal reasoning, as civilian doctrine is often invoked at the
leisure of a court in need of adding meat to a skeleton of an argument' That is
the inherent beauty of Louisiana's mixedjurisdiction statusM-jurists may borrow,
compare, and assimilate the best aspects of civilian legal theory with those of the
common law.
Judge Dennis argues strenuously throughout Hulin that Louisiana judges
interpret, rather than make, law: "Under Louisiana's Constitution, the power to
make substantive laws is vested exclusively in the legislature. Under the State's
Constitution and Civil Code, Louisiana courts cannot make law but are bound to
decide cases according to their best understanding of the law established by
legislation and custom."' 2' Interestingly, in Hulin, the Blackstonian model of
adjudication espoused by Justice Scalia and perhaps loosely followed by a few
122. See Mabury v. Madison. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137. 177 (1803). (quoted in Harper at 107
(Scalia, J., concurring) for his mantra that judicial interpretation is. in theory. to .'declare what the law
is'-not what the law shall be"(retroactive in essence)).
123. See Fisch, supra note 6. at 1077. See also Justice O'Connor's dissents in: Reynoldsville
Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749. 115 S. Ct. 1745 (1995); Hper v. Virginia Dept. of Taxation, 509
U.S. 86. 113 S. Ct. 2510 (1993); James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, I11 S. Ct.
2439(1991).
124. See, e.g.. Bergeron v. Bergeron. 492 So. 2d 1193 (La. 1986) ("Modem civilian method often
calls upon the courts to develop jurisprudential precepts and techniques in the implementation of
legislated law." Id. at 1197).
125. See A. N. Yiannopoulos, Louisiana Civil Law: A Lost Cause?. 54 Tul. L Rev. 830 (1980):
In the folds of Louisiana law, there has always been a niche for the civil law. Louisiana has
been, and mostprobably will continue to be, a mixed jurisdiction. This is a blessing rather
than a handicap, because Louisiana has a choice in the course of her future legal
development and in the pursuit of justice for all her citizens.
Id. at 848. See also Harriet S. Daggett ct al., A Reappraisal Appraised: A Brieffor the Civil Law of
Louisiana, 12 Tul. L Rev. 12 (1937).
126. Hulin v. FMbreboard Corp.. 178 P.3d 316. 319 (5th Cir.' 1999).
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other justices, is merged with the Montesquian'2 7 model of adjudication reflected
in the French civil law system. Witness the lofty convergence of these
philosophies from different continents and long ago eras! Hear the cries and moans
of all modern day pragmatists!
2. Idealistic Civilian Theory
The U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals would have made Brown and Moreau-
Lislet proud,"' given Hulin's heavy reliance upon the traditional civilian model of
adjudication. One begins from the presupposition that judicial decisions are not
law or law making, but "only evidence of what the court thinks is the law."'9 From
there it is fairly easy to ascertain that "there could not be questions of conflicts in
time between successive customs or successive jurisprudential rulings.' '
This conclusion may be met from two directions, which are seemingly at odds.
The first pertains to the method of judicial interpretation. The declarative theory
does not admit to inconsistent interpretation because the positive source (statute)
is thought to contain only one correct interpretation, and thus any other previous
deficient interpretation will be treated as if it never existed. The second relates to
the status of interpretation. Because a judgment is nothing more "than a pure
interpretation of legislation.... this interpretation has no authority beyond the case
in which it is given" (i.e., it is not an official source of law).' It may strike some
as baffling that a mere interpretation may be empowered by the truth of its words
to overcome a previous interpretation, which likewise must have at one time been
thought to have contained the truest interpretation of legislation. Yet, this
interpretative search for the genuine interpretation is declared to have little
precedential effect or force of law. But this is probably delving into areas in which
this writer has little authority to pursue and which the reader likewise has little
desire.
In summation, judicial decisionmaking is by nature retroative,' 32 but one
should note that the word "retroactive" is foreign when inserted into civilian
interpretive methodology. 33 In civilian jurisdictions the question of retroactivity
127. See 8enerally, Andre Pouille, Le Pouvoir Judiciare et les Tribunaux (1984) ("Everything
begins with Montesquieu where he wrote: 'in every state there are three kinds of powers.... Liberty
cannot survive unless the power to judge is separated from the legislative and executive powers.'" Id.
at 20).
128. These two men were appointed by the Louisiana legislature in 1806 to prepare Louisiana's
first Civil Code, now known as the Digest of 1808 or the Louisiana Civil Code of 1808.
129. Norton v. Crescent City Ice Manufacturing Co., 150 So. 855, 858 (La. 1933).
130. Paul Roubier, Le Droit Transitoire (Conflits Des Lois Dans Le Temps) 23 n.7
(2d. ed. 1960) (trans. by J. R. Trahan).
131. Id.at25n.7.
132. Jacques Ghestin &Gilles Goubeaux. Traite de Droit Civil: ntroduction Generale, at413-14
n.460 (3d ed. 1990) (trans. by J. R. Trahan).
133. See Francois Tene, Introduction GeneraleAu Droit 247 n.228 (4thed. 1998) (trans. byJ. R.
Trahan) ("More than retroactive the jurisprudence is. in the image of interpretative laws, declarative."Id.).
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does not arise because a jurisprudential rule is applied in all new actions without
any consideration of the date on which the facts underlying the action occurred.
It is not a subject which can be countenanced by the theory.
3. Theory and Practicality Collide
Such a view has much intuitive appeal for its logical consistency, but is
deficient when placed against the backdrop of modem legal reality, in which
society has become increasingly regulated and legalistic."s Consider the thoughts
of French jurists upon their own theories:
['Me] contemporary doctrine has become more realistic. It has made
contact with the customary formations of the jurisprudence; it sees in
them, in general, a source of modem law, some would even say the sole
source of modem customary law. . . .Moreover, changes in the
jurisprudence are known and commented upon, just like new
legislation. t"
Similarly, it is hard to imagine how one could seriously entertain that Halphen,
with its statutory-like construction, does not represent "law," as that term is under-
stood by modem legal scholars, including those within the civilian tradition.'" It
134. See Mary Ann Glendon, The Sources of Law in a Changing Legal Order, 17 Creighton L
Rev. 663 (1984):
Civil and common law systems alike were fundamentally transformed in the transition from
liberal laissez-faire governments to modem social welfare states.... In the process, the
source of law that had distinctively characterized each legal system, and the legal methods
associated with it, lost their centrality. First. case law in the common law and codes in the
civil law lost ground to modem statutes... while civil law judges were becoming more
conscious of and willing to exercise their law-making powers, finally, administrative law
has encroached on all preexisting sources of law. We have entered the age of legislation
tuiumphant, the judge militant, and bureaucracy rampant.
Id. at 682-83.
135. Roubier, supra note 130, at 24-25 n.7.
.136. In many, if not most, contemporary civil law systems. jurisprudence is now regarded as an
autnomous source of "law." See Paul Foriers, Les Relations des Sources Exreties et Non Ecrites du
Drolt, in 2 La Pensee Juridique De Paul Foriers 683-85 (1982); Mary Ann Glendon et al., Comparative
Legal Traditions 242 (2d ed. 1994); 1 Gabriel Marty & Pierre Raynaud, Droit Civil: Introduction
Generale a L'Etude do Droit 215. 217-18 n.119 (2d ed. 1972); Michel Miaille, Une Introduction
Critique au Droit 245-51 (1976); Boris Starck, Droit Civil: Introduction 51-53 nn.119-125 (1972);
Alex Weill & Francois Terr, Droit Civil: Introduction Generale 205 n.196, 232-34 n.221 (4th ed.
1979); 1 Konrad Zweigert & Hein Kotz, An Introduction to Comparative Law 272-73 (1977). This
development springs, in part, from a fairly recent revolution in "hermeneutics," that is the theory of
understanding or interpretation. Taking their cue from hermenuetical theorists in such fields as
linguistics and literary criticism, many civil law scholars maintain that jurisprudence, to theextent that
it entails "interpretation," is inevitably "creative," that is, it adds something new to the text of the
legislation that wasn't there before. To that extent, these scholars argue. jurisprudence is a genuine
source of law, one that is independent, to at least some extent, from legislation. See. e.g., Floriers.
supra. at 683-85 and Mialle, supra at 245-51.
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was the focal point of immediate legal scholarship,'" discussion and judicial
decisions, and it was not until legislative action was taken that its validity and
application was ever in doubt.3 Taking the analysis in this direction is to beg the
question of whetherjudicial decisions in Louisiana are indeed "law,"' 39 which shall
remain, for purposes of this paper, a rather untapped issue of grand scope. But
how could one not agree that an insurance company may change its rates and
coverage depending upon what test courts are applying in regards to product
liability law, whether it is new legislation or ajudicial interpretation of legislation?
Undoubtedly, many companies arrange their operating policies, financial affairs
and insurance coverage in reliance upon legal theories or judicial decisions
supplied by Louisiana courts.
The French jurist Roubier noted, "It is necessary, nevertheless, to agree that
there is an insurmountable obstacle [facing any attempt to limit the retroactivity of
judicial decisions] in our law: it is the impossibility of determining, with sufficient
precision, the moment at which the jurisprudence becomes fixed."'" It is not until
the jurisprudence "fixes" the interpretation of the legislation (jurisprudence
constante) that ajurisprudential rule comes into being and relates back to when the
legislation was promulgated. Of course the "insurmountable obstacle" this jurist
refers to is the lack of legal recognition afforded jurisprudential law in civilian
137. See. e.g., Michelle M. Hloss, Note, Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.-A New Product
in the Area of Products Liability, 47 La. L Rev. 637 (1987). See also, William E. Crawford,
Developments in the Law, 1985.86, A Faculty Symposium, 47 La. L Rev. 485 (1986).
138. See Louisiana Products Liability Act, La. R.S. 9:2800.51-.59 (1991).
139. Compare State of Louisiana v. Cenac, 132 So.2d 897 (La. App. ist Cir. 1961), writ denied
132 So. 2d 928 (La. 196 1) ("We shall first consider the astounding contention of the state that this court
now possesses power and authority to overrule or set aside a line of jurisprudence heretofore
established, reaffirmed and reiterated by the Supreme Court .. " The court goes on to say this is an
"utterly incredible argument." Id. at 899). Compare Barry Nicholas. French Law of Contract 14
(1982):
[Wlhat we should call the law of torts, which is stated in the Code Civilin only five articles,
is very largely a creation of the courts. The writers regularly, and increasingly, take account
of jurisprudence; no practitioner would fail to deal with it in presenting a case.... The
Constitutional theory that jurisprudence cannot be a legal source is, however, normally
maintained. Theory and practice may be reconciled by drawing a distinction between a
source (in law) and an authority (in fact). It is an obvious and important fact that courts do
follow previous decisions.... But it is nevertheless a fact and not a rule; no court is legally
required to follow any previous decision. There is no system of binding precedent, though
there is a practice which produces similar results.
Id. at 15. Compare John Bell, Comparing Precedent, 82 Cornell L Rev. 1243 (1997) (reviewing D.
Neil MacCormick & Robert S. Summers, Interpreting Precedents (1997):
[Rlecently, the attitudes of Common Law and Continental Law have been drawing closer.
On the Continent, statute law is making something of its primacy; lawyers no longer see
decision-making as a merely technical and automatic process, but accept that the
comprehensive principles laid down by statutes call for broad interpretation, and have begun
to treat the jurisprudence constante of the courts as an independent source of law.
Id. at 1244 (quoting I Konrad Zweigert & Hein Kltz, Introduction to Comparative Law 71 (Tongweir
trans., Oxford U. Press 2d rev. ed. 1987))).
140. Roubier supra note 130, at 26 n.7. See also Ghestin & Goubeaux, supra note 132, at 414
n.460.
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systems, such as may be found in the common law rule of stare decisis."4' A lack
of consensus concerning the number of uniform rulings necessary to trigger
jurisprudence constante 42 and the secondary legal weight given it, may lead to
imprecise observations about when and how much force judicial interpretations
should be given. Thus, it will be difficult to demonstrate when the "law" changed
and exactly what kind of reliance one may have upon judicial interpretations.
Some French jurists lament this lack of determinability:
Nevertheless this last consideration, if it is decisive for French law, where
the jurisprudence is fixed only little by little by the repetition of decisions,
would have no bearing in the Anglo-Saxon countries, where thanks to the
system of the authority of judicial precedent (case-law), an isolated
decision of justice suffices to cause a true rule of law to appear, one that
thereafter has obligatory value. One cannot, then, be surprised to see that,
in these countries, some efforts have been made to stop the retroactivity
of new jurisprudential rulings. 3
Of course the import of the above quote will depend upon Louisiana's
treatment of precedent, an issue that proceeds lockstep with the legal status of
judicial interpretation and to what extent Louisiana is either a common law or civil
law jurisdiction. Once again, these are chronically debatable topics, which expand
well beyond the confines of this paper.
But certainly, cases such as Halphen do not appear to operate in a manner
consistent with jurisprudence constante. A cynic would likely note that Louisiana
courts often seem to invoke the theory of jurisprudence constante when desiring
to overrule judicial precedent and conversely that one opinion, especially when
penned by the Louisiana Supreme Court, is almost always precedent enough.
Whatever one's views, it is hard to deny that the federal system, constitutional
rulings and the rule of stare decisis have not made some headway into Louisiana's
practical use of precedent.
Similarly, if Louisiana is going to invoke the civilian approach to
interpretation, which embraces absolute judicial retroactivity, then it must accept
the civilian function of the judge, as the mouthpiece of the legislature, and the
accompanying treatment of precedent. Stare decisis in the common law provides
some protection against adjudicative retroactivity because of a court's strong
reluctance to abandon precedent. But, in civilian systems a court may abandon a
judicial interpretation if it feels that the previous court erred. On a theoretical level
this may cause concern, as it could lead to less predictability in the case law, which
many persons view as the "law."
141. See Black's Law Dictionary (6thed. 1990) (Stare decisis isa"Doctrine that, when the court
has once laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that
principle, and apply it to all future cases, where facts are substantially the same." id. at 1406).
142. See Ghestin & Goubeaux, supra note 132. at 414 n.460 (Jurisprudence constante recognizes
that authority attaches to a concordant series of decisions. It is an indirect source of positive law and
emerges when the jurisprudence has fixed the interpretation of legislation).
143. Roubier. supra note 130. at 26 n.7.
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VI. FURTHER ANALYSIS AND EXPLORATION OF ADJUDICATIVE RETROACTIVrIY
A. The Decision-Time and Transactional-Time Models
This is a brief introduction to a new doctrinal approach which sets forth two
different ways one might view the temporal effects of judicial decisions. Each
functions according to its moniker. The "decision-time model" asserts that the
judge is to apply the most current formulation of the law in effect at the time the
decision is rendered. Thus, there is theoretically no retroactivity, as the judge will
apply the most current formulation of the law, irrespective of when any events
occurred. In other words, the law is not given retroactive effect, but produces a
uniformly retroactive result.'" The "transaction-time model" begins with "the
premise that parties should be governed by the law in effect at the time of their
actions."' "4 The result is often similar to the decision-time model, since most
judicial decisions are based on the most current formulation of the law. But the
premise underlying this approach raises many issues (such as what constitutes
"law," and what are the underlying equitable considerations and societal policies?)
and has opened the door for the characterization of judicial decisions as
prospective. The attendant application and reasoning behind the "transaction-time"
model has become circular and muddled: "The question is thus not what law is to
be applied but rather what the transaction-time law is. If the decision-time result
is to be reached, it must be because decision-time law has become transaction-time
law, i.e., because the new law is effective retroactively."'"
Though not fully explored, the leading proponent of the decision-time model
asserts that it is not a completely inflexible approach. He claims that doctrines such
as remedial discretion, which encompass harmless error and equitable tolling,
would allow courts to reach just results without deforming retroactivity
jurisprudence. As a default, he asserts that the substantive law of a particular area
may provide relief.4 7
This model is basically an emulation of the civilian and Blackstonian models
of adjudication. But it attempts to take us back to a time in which these theories
were irrebuttably the law by banishing the phrase "judicial retroactivity." Instead
of acknowledging the problem as an outgrowth of theory colliding with practicality,
the decision-time model blames the theory for getting off track." Its consistency
is logically appealing, but its assessment of the modern legal world may be lacking
utility and its assertions of flexibility may turn out to be false.
144. See Roosevelt, supra note 6, at 1081-91 (proposing that this surprisingly simple model was
the norm before the Warren Court's Linkletter v. Walker opinion).
145. Roosevelt, supra note 6, at 1078-79.
146. Id., at 100-81.
147. Id., at 1089-90.
148. Think of the decision time-model as a bottom up rather than a top down approach.
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B. Legal Limitations on Adjudicative Retroactivity
A major reason why the prospect of unlimited retroactivity of adjudication is
not the juggernaut it might seem is that "[in both civil and common law systems,
the fully retroactive effect of every judicial decision is barred by independent legal
principles of law designed to place limits on litigation in the interest of legal
stability." 49 History flushes out the Roman legal concept of causae finitae
(extinguished claims), in which there were three basic operative events. An
explication is provided by the jurisconsult Ulpian:
A judgment puts an end to claims because one must accept that which
emanates from him who has the right to judge; a compromise, because of
the good faith that is attached to the validity of the act; and finally
[prescription, because] consent or long silence implies the abandonment
of intentions, which the new law can no longer cause to be revived."'
The early development of causaefinitae has left enduring legacies in both the
common and civil law and is easily recognizable in the modem legal formulations
of resjudicata and prescription (statute of limitations)."' Besides the basic benefit
of allowing one to continue his or her existence without an infinite specter of
looming or multiplicative litigation, these legal mechanisms also neatly resolve
many problems relating to conflicts of law in time.
1. Res Judicata
The operation and policy behind resjudicata is quite simple. The only major
coupling of this principle to the topic at hand is likely to be the distinction between
causa finitae and causa pendens (litigation in progress). A "pending juridical
situation [causa pendens], that is to say, one that has not been closed according to
... [judgment, compromise, prescription (causafinitae)] at the time at which the
new law is promulgated, will find itself submitted to the new law.""'  This
distinction could carry great consequences in the modern world of litigation, -in
which a cause of action may wind through the legal system for a number of years,
extending the effect of new judicial interpretation well beyond the prescriptive
period." '3 But one should keep in mind the rather obvious conclusion that "the res
judicata consequences of a final, unappealed judgment on the merits [are not]
altered on a legal principle subsequently overruled in another case.""
149. Hulin v. Fibreboard Corp., 178 F.3d 316, 323 (5th Cir. 1999).
150. See Roubier. supra note 130, at 32 n.8.
151. See Hulin, 178 F.3d at 323: "in Louisiana, the principles of resjudicata and extinguishment
of rights or obligations by prescription limit the retrospective effect of retroactive legislation." Id.
152. Patrice Level, Essai Sur Les Conflicts De Lois Dans Le Temps. n. 19, at 33. fn. 47 (1959).
153. See. e.g., Hulin v. Fibreboard Corp., 178 F.3d 316 (5th Cir. 1999) and Toups v. Sears,
Roebuck and Co., Inc., 507 So. 2d 809 (La. 1987).
154. Cox v. Cox, 426 So. 2d 656, 658 (La. App. Ist Cir.), writ denied, 430 So. 2d 99 (1983)
(quoting Federated Department Stores, Inc. v. Moittie. 452 U.S. 394, 101 S. Ct. 2424(1981) (Petitioner
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2. Prescription
Likewise, liberative prescription is, in most cases, easy to apply to changes in
the jurisprudence. If a newjudicial interpretation of the Civil Code represents how
the law always was, then it follows that if one's claim has prescribed in light of the
new interpretation of the old law than it cannot give rise to a current cause of
action. In other words, new interpretations cannot give rise to new causes of action
if they are outside of the prescriptive period. Prescription may appear arbitrary and
in some cases, such as when combined with a jurisprudential shift, may create the
appearance of unconscionable results, as illustrated in the following hypothetical.
Theonice and Maxie are brothers who spent their last 30 years working for a
sandblasting company on the Vermilion Bay. Both also happen to have smoked for
the last thirty years. On January 1 Theonice is diagnosed with lung cancer and
amazingly, two days later on January 3, Maxie also discovers that he has lung
cancer. The two brothers consult an attorney, Claude, who tells them that he
cannot take their cases because the burden of proof is too high and he just lost a
similar case. On January 2 of the next year, a new jurisprudential rule is
announced similar to the "per se" rule announced in Halphen. The lawyer
immediately remembers the irate Cajun brethren and attempts to contact them. He
does so, and files suit the next day, January 3, on their behalf. Theonice's suit is
dismissed on an exception of prescription due to the running of one year.' But
Maxie settles with the tobacco and sandblasting companies for two million dollars,
due to a very real fear of the per se test placing this case in the hands of an
unbridled jury.
The arbitrariness in the above hypothetical is very obvious and may appear
patently unfair. Nevertheless, causafinitae, as manifested by prescription and res
judicata, is needed to preserve some continuity and predictability in the law,
counteracting such disruptive manifestations as adjudicative retroactivity. It is the
point at which the cost to society overshadows that of a few unfair, isolated
incidents. One can observe that within the prescriptive window, a judicial
interpretation of the law may change, changing with it the law applicable to the
case, such as the burden of proof or the alteration or recognition of a cause of
action. Imagine the devastating effect that a new jurisprudential cause of action
could have if its retroactive effect were not foreclosed by prescription. A company
could face an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim for sexual
harassment dating back to an era in which the term was not part of society's
collective vocabulary.
But keep in mind that this window may expand beyond the typical one-year
tort prescription, such as the maximum three year prescriptive period for
unsuccessfully invoked the Lovell test (judicial retroactivity) in an attempt to resurrect a prior divorce
judgement based upon a shift in the treatment of the law towards military retirement benefits. The court
denied retroactivity due to res judicata.)).
155. See La. Civ. Code art. 3492.
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professional malpractice (in the instance of contra non valentum),056 the five-year
liberative prescription on instruments and promissory notes' and the ten-year
default rule for liberative prescription.'
3. Time-Frame Torts
Difficulties also emerge when one considers time-frame torts.'59 Tbe key date
for determining what law applies is presumptively the date that a plaintiff's cause
of action accrues, that is, once the elements of fault, causation and damage have
occurred."W Superficially this is a simple task, but consider the current debate in
smoking and asbestos cases, as to what sort of manifestation is necessary for a
cause of action to accrue.' 6' The manifestation rule also encounters difficulty with
the legal principle of contra non valentem." Therefore, it is not surprising that
dissatisfaction with the manifestation rule in cases involving long-latency diseases
has begun to surface.'" The alternative would be to apply the law that was in
effect when the plaintiff was exposed to the damaging substance (asbestos,
cigarette smoke). This is known as the "exposure rule,"'" which has not been
followed in Louisiana. Nevertheless, one should be aware that in areas of law such
as this, there is a latent conflict between competing theories, which could trigger
adjudicative retroactivity analysis.
C. Principles Animating Analysis of Temporal Effects of Judicial Overrulings
Gleaning issues from the last forty years of retroactivity analysis is about as
facile a task as spotting issues on a law school torts exam, and the divergence of
opinion upon this topic should be quite apparent. Both are excellent reasons why
one should be aware of the practicalities involved in order to better articulate
arguments. Three basic interests typically animate discussion of the temporal limits
ofjudicial decisions: reliance interests (fairness),'" efficiency,'" and the role of the
judicial branch. These considerations generally vie for the majority of attention in
156. La. R.S. 9:5628 (1997).
157. See La. Civ. Code art. 3498.
158. See La. Civ. Code art. 3499.
159. See William E. Crawford & David J. Shelby, 1L Torts, 53 La. L Rev. 1011 (1993) (for the
derivation of this term of art).
160. Id. at 1014-15.
161. See generally Brown v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 52 F.3d 524 (5th Cir. 1995). See also
Chustz v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 961 F. Supp. 143 (M.D. La. 1996).
162. See Crawford & Shelby. supra note 159, at 1015 (quoting Corsey v. State Dep't of
Corrections. 375 So. 2d 1319. 1321 (La. 1979) ("Contra non velentum is an exception to prescription
where in fact and for good cause plaintiff is unable to exercise his cause of action when it accrues."')).
163. See Pitre v. GAF Corp., 705 So. 2d 1149 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1997).
164. Id.at 1151.
165. See Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 92 S. Ct. 349 (1971); Cipriano v. City of
Houma. 395 U.S. 701, 89 S. Ct. 1897 (1969).
166. See Fisch, supra note 6, at 1098-99.
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a legal system's choice of law, depending on its teleological leanings. If swift legal
change and neutrality of the judicial branch is sought, then imposing maximum
retroactivity upon judicial decisions, though not always fair and possibly at a higher
social cost, would generally reflect the preferred route. Conversely, if promoting
fairness and equity in the judicial system is a primary goal, then courts should be
allowed to limit the retroactive effect of their decisions, leading to slower
implementation of the law, but causing less disturbance and lessening the
transitional costs. 67
It is generally observed that textualists and advocates of judicial restraint favor
pure retroactivity in all judicial decisions, I" while judicial activists appreciate the
release that nonretroactivity may provide when attempting to bring about smoother
transitions between legal regimes.'" This categorization may seemcounterintuitive
at first, but consider how legislatures function, under a basic premise of
nonretroactivity, allowing them to generally draft and implement new law with
minimum disruptive effect. A court, on the other hand, functioning under a blanket
of retroactivity, must carefully weigh the import of its decision, because there is
little built-in tolerance for a jurisprudence that "shift[s] and spring[s]" with great
ease.1
70
Contemporaneously, many argue that imposing judicial decisions only
prospectively gives them a characteristic of legislation, involving separation of
powers doctrine. "Fully retroactive decisionmaking [is] considered a principal
distinction between the judicial and legislative power."'' Judicial and legislative
acts are generally distinguished in that one is a determination of existing law in
relation to some existing thing or fact, while the other is a predetermination of what
the law shall be for the regulation of all future cases.
Whatever side of the debate one is drawn to, one should remember that
imposing every judicial decision retroactively will continue to produce difficult,
seemingly inequitable, cases especially in our increasingly litigious, regulated
167. Id. at 1084-87.
168. See generally Justice Scalia's opinions in Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749.
115 S. Ct. 1745 (1995); Harper v. Virginia Dept of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86. 113 S. Ct. 2510 (1993);
James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 11I S. Ct. 2439 (1991).
169. See James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, i1 S. Ct. 2439 (1991).
(Prospective adjudication, as an "equitable method has its own drawback: it tends to relax the forceof
precedent, by minimizing the costs of overruling, and thereby allows the courts to act with a freedom
comparable to that of legislatures." Id. at 536, 111 S. Ct. at 2444.)
170. See James B. Beam Distilling Co., 501 U.S. at 543, 111 S. Ct. at 2447.
171. Harper v. Virginia Dep't. of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 107, 113 S. Ct. 2510. 2523 (1993)
(Scalia. J., concurring) (quoting Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations Which
Rest upon the Legislative Power of the States of the American Union, § 91 (Little, Brown & Co. 1868)).
See also Harper, 509 U.S. at 107-08, 113 S. Ct. at 2523 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Prospective
decisionmaking was known to foe and friend alike as a practical tool of judicial activism, born out of
disregard for stare decisis. In the eyes of its enemies, the doctrine 'smacked of the legislative
process'... (and] 'encroached on the prerogatives of the legislative department of government."'). See
also Hulin v. Fibreboard Corp., 178 P.3d 316. 320 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting Jackson v. Doe, 296 So.
2d 323 (La. 1974) (Summers, J.. concurring) ("Prospective [only] application of judicial decisions is
legislating.")).
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society. Recognizing this phenomena, a search for an acceptable framework will
likely persist and intensify. Currently, the simplistic answer to the adjudicative
retroactivity problem seems to be either that difficult cases make bad law or that
petitioners out there need to accept their fate with adose of eighteenth century legal
theory.
VII. CONCLUSION
The holding in Hulin appears to set forth a rule of absolute retroactivity for
judicial interpretation, with the exception of the phrase: "unless the rendering court
specifies otherwise." There is breathing room in this statement, which may
ultimately deliver Hulin from unfavorable treatment by the Louisiana Supreme
Court. Yet, the Hulin court offers no guidance as to when a court may "render
otherwise" and instead seems to amply demonstrate that Louisiana courts should
never "render otherwise."
Suppose the Louisiana Supreme Court adopts the Hulin rationale as its own
and we now have a legal rule of absolute retroactivity or at least an almost
irrebuttable presumption of retroactivity. Do we want such a narrow rule?
Wouldn't it lead to a narrowing of the judicial function and perhaps limit judicial
creativity? What about the really difficult cases? How well does it comport with
our mixed approach to law and precedent? Consider the function of the judiciary,
as seen through the eyes of a prominent Louisiana jurist, Albert Tate:
[it is important for us to recognize and restate the obvious truth that the
courts do possess and should exercise law-making responsibilities. By
frank recognition that judicial creativity is an essential component of the
process of deciding cases, we may perhaps find courage to correct the
misinformation on the subject.... Misled by Francis Bacon's half-truth,
'Judges ought to remember that their office is... to interpret law, and not
to make law' and by several generations of oversimplifying high school
civics teachers, multitudes of our citizenry have come to believe that it is
somehow improper for judges to admit to law-innovation, law-choice, or
law-revision.... If the courts will not perform this duty, the legislatures
cannot-and the reasoned development of the law and its ability to serve
current needs must suffer. 72
Despite the intimations above, in the nonconstitutional, private law realm the
Louisianajudiciary appears tohave functioned in arather civilian (narrow) manner.
This conclusory observation is derived from the fact that Louisiana, unlike many
of its common law neighbors, has almost no adjudicative retroactivity
jurisprudence based upon nonconstitutional case law. The law is, in virtually all
cases, "silently applied." Hulin is one of a few cases in which the possibility of
prospectivity was raised and tellingly, the federal district court's treatment of the
subject was poor. Of course it is doubtful that this development resulted from
1
172. Albert Tate, The baw.Making Function of the Jludge, 28 La. L Rev. 211(1968).
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purposeful obeisance to civilian interpretive principles and a disavowal of the
common law. It more likely resulted from the backdrop of the Civil Code, which
does not recognize jurisprudence as an official source of law.
What does the lack of decisions regarding temporal conflicts within
nonconstitutional judicial interpretation indicate for Louisiana and the Hulin
holding? Two things. First, Louisiana should not foreclose the possibility of non-
retroactive holdings when it comes to constitutional overrulings. Constitutional
law shifts with the mores of the country and appointment of Presidents. It does not
properly fit into the microcosm of legislative and judicial congruence, as the U.S.
Supreme Court is an outside force, interrupting the idealist interaction of these two
bodies with a crack of the gavel. Constitutional decisions often involve intensely
personal matters, such as family or criminal law, which frequently cry out in either
temporal direction. Additionally, the lack of prescription in many instances, such
as writs of habeas corpus, leads to further distortions of the retroactive effect.
Despite the lack of a comprehensible analytical structure, maintaining the
possibility of occasional prospective holdings against a presumption of retroactivity
seems prudent.' The fact that all of Louisiana's nonretroactive holdings in the
last twenty years have been constitutional in nature should reveal the functional
wisdom of such an approach.
Second, and perhaps lamentably, if Louisiana is going to stand by such an
absolute rule for judicial interpretation of legislation, it will have to strive after
non-creativity in its holdings. Judicial activism or creativity is usually a precursor
to issues of temporal conflicts.'74 One should be able to perceive that the more
creative an interpretation, the more likely temporal disruptions will be felt, either
immediately or in the event of a later reversal. "' If the Louisiana judiciary is
cognizant of an absolute ban on prospective decision making, it would tend to
discourage opinion writing which leans towards "law-innovation."
Some persons will likely rejoice at such a proposition. But what about the
"reasoned development of the law and its ability to serve current needs" and the
effect this might have upon res nova decisionmaking? Sometimes, as with
outdated, irreconcilable or silent legislation, a judge is called upon to fill in the
gaps, to shore up the bulkhead, and oftentimes this calls for bold thinking. Finally,
creative judicial interpretation adds color and animation to the field of law, gives
crescendo to legal discourse, and often spurs the legislature to action. It is hoped
173. One should not forget that a remedial approach may be utilized in order to mitigate a harsh
retroactive application. See the discussion of Reynoldsville in Part V.B. infra
174. This usually occurs in two ways. the most obvious being a creative departure from established
jurisprudence. The second begins from an original creative interpretation of legislation and then a
subsequent. narrower interpretation which overnles a previous line of cases. Hypothetically, if the
Louisiana Legislature had not stepped in with the LPLA. the Louisiana Supreme Court could have
reversed its decision in Halphen; and then we may have had plaintiffs screaming that they were robbed
of their previously vested cause of action.
175. See Ghestin & Goubeaux. supra note 132. at 414 n.460 ("[To the extent that the
interpretation is creative, there is in fact an enrichment of the positive law that is endowed with a
retroactive effect. This effect will be all the more apparent when the interpretation is more creative.").
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that Louisiana's adjudicative retroactivity analysis will continue to accommodate
such a need.
If one was searching for a solution which purported to address the problems
accompanying adjudicative retroactivity, then one should look beyond this paper.
This is a challenge for future lawyers, judges and jurists to confront and dispose
of. It is hoped that these words will better equip those who choose to pursue such
a task.
William Reed Huguet"
* Recipient of the 1999.2000 Association Henri Capitant, Louisiana Chapter award for best
student paper on a civil law topic or a comparative law topic with a core emphasis in the civil law.
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